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5. Scotland and the Politics of 
Intelligence Accountability
Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris
This chapter explores the politics of intelligence accountability in the 
context of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the 
2015 General Election in the UK. Drawing upon Peter Gill’s model 
for assessing the effectiveness of security intelligence accountability, 
it argues that the Scottish Government’s proposals for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland indicated a vague and 
conservative intention to maintain similar mechanisms to the 
existing UK political settlement. By exploring the accountability 
mechanisms for security intelligence in other jurisdictions, this 
chapter suggests that shortcomings in the Scottish Government’s 
proposals could have been addressed by learning lessons and 
adopting practices and processes from beyond the UK. The aftermath 
of the referendum — particularly the landslide victory in Scotland for 
the pro-independence SNP in the 2015 UK General Election — may 
herald consequences for both intelligence accountability in the 
UK and any future plan for accountability mechanisms in an 
independent Scotland. The previously unconsidered prospect of 
direct SNP representation on the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) — now a reality in the UK — raises the scenario that 
pro-independence politicians will develop the expertise, capital, and 
political legitimacy necessary for effective intelligence accountability 
that were lacking in the pre-referendum political landscape.
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In a democratic society, accountability is the requirement for those 
in positions of power to provide answers to those whom they serve. 
Accountability depends, therefore, upon either the presence of an 
informed, inquisitive, and engaged public or an array of elected 
representatives with similar qualities who act on the public’s behalf. 
Although seemingly straightforward, accountability is not a simple 
administrative task; it poses a series of profound and fundamentally 
political challenges concerning the shape, composition, scope, power 
and limitations of any such regime. These challenges are compounded 
when one seeks to ensure accountability for the actions of intelligence 
and security agencies, organisations which, by their very nature, 
operate in conditions of secrecy. It has been argued that the problem 
here can be easily stated: ‘how to provide for democratic control of 
a governmental function and institutions which are essential to the 
survival and flourishing of the state but which must operate to a certain 
extent in justifiable secrecy’.1 Ensuring the democratic accountability 
of intelligence services has been a persistent problem for western 
democracies, a challenge compounded by renewed concerns in the 
post-9/11 era that will undoubtedly persist in the years to come.2
In the UK there are various levels of intelligence accountability; 
however, the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
is the principal mechanism that exists to provide for the accountability 
of the nation’s intelligence agencies.3 Peter Gill has commented upon 
how the history of the oversight of security intelligence agencies in the 
UK is short, and how, with one or two exceptions, ‘it simply did not exist 
before the 1970s, though its spread since then has been rapid’.4 The ISC 
was first established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine 
1  I. Leigh, ‘The Accountability of Security and Intelligence Agencies’, in Handbook of 
Intelligence Studies, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 
pp. 67–81 (p. 67).
2  Hans Born and Ian Leigh, ‘Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services’, 
in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, ed. by Institute Stockholm 
International Peace Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 193–214.
3  Mark Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (2007), pp. 75–99; H. Bochel, A. Defty, 
and J. Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the Intelligence Services 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
4 Peter Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 
1 (2007), pp. 14–37 (p. 14). 
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the policy, administration and expenditure of the Security Service, 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). The Justice and Security Act 2013 reformed the 
ISC: making it a Committee of Parliament; providing greater powers; 
and increasing its remit to include oversight of operational activity and 
the wider intelligence and security activities of Government. Other than 
the three main intelligence and security agencies, the ISC examines 
the intelligence-related work of the Cabinet Office including: the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC); the Assessments Staff; and the National 
Security Secretariat. The ISC also provides oversight of Defence 
Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence and the Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. Members of the ISC 
are appointed by Parliament and the Committee reports directly to 
Parliament. The ISC may also make reports to the Prime Minister on 
matters which are sensitive in relation to national security.5
Intelligence oversight in the UK emerged and developed in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; however, the effectiveness 
of the UK’s accountability mechanisms have come increasingly into 
question. The responses to terrorist attacks on 9/11, the events that led 
to the Iraq War and the more recent series of disclosures from both 
Wikileaks and Edward Snowden revealed a range of controversial 
programs and activities undertaken by the intelligence agencies that 
were previously unknown to the public, media, and many politicians. 
It was against this backdrop — and in advance of the 2014 referendum 
on Scottish independence — that the Scottish Government decided 
upon the measures it would propose to ensure the accountability of 
a prospective security and intelligence agency for an independent 
Scotland. These measures were subsequently published in the White 
Paper on Scottish independence titled Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an 
Independent Scotland.6 This chapter evaluates the Scottish Government’s 
proposal for intelligence accountability, locating it in comparative 
context by understanding the mechanisms that are in place in other 
5  The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘About the Committee’ 
(2016), http://isc.independent.gov.uk/ 
6  Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2013), http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/0043 
9021.pdf. 
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similar jurisdictions. It argues that, despite the claim that a range of 
international comparators were studied,7 the Scottish Government’s 
plans sought to replicate the existing UK model, without an appreciation 
of the challenges of such an approach. It concludes by exploring the 
political aftermath of the both the 2014 Scottish referendum and the 2015 
UK General Election, with a particular focus upon the consequences of 
this new political landscape for intelligence accountability in the UK 
and in the context of any future referendum on Scottish independence.
Examining the proposed measures for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland
In evaluating the performance of the ISC, Peter Gill proposed six 
variables that are important in determining the effectiveness of 
any committee that oversees security intelligence: its form, mandate, 
membership, resources, access to information, and reporting.8 In Gill’s model 
the form of an intelligence oversight committee depends upon the 
situation and status of the parent assembly. For example Gill makes the 
distinction between the committee traditions found in the US Congress 
and those in parliamentary systems, wherein the former offers the 
potential for independent action in terms of budgets, appointments 
and investigations, whilst in the latter, parliamentary committees are 
more likely to be the ‘creatures of the executive’.9 Gill continues that 
the mandate — or terms of reference — for such a committee is likely 
to be a result of its form. Here Gill discusses the distinction between 
the relative freedom and independence of the US congressional model 
and the strictures of the UK statutory model. Considering a UK-style 
model he concludes that, to the extent that the executive is the dominant 
force in writing statutes, a committee’s powers will reflect government 
preferences rather than those of an independent legislator.10 The 
selection of membership for any intelligence accountability committee is 
critical to its effectiveness and legitimacy. Gill considers that members’ 
independence of the executive will be clearest if the members are chosen 
7  Ibid., p. 261.
8  Gill (2007).
9  Ibid., p. 16.
10  Ibid.
 1295. Scotland and the Politics of Intelligence Accountability
by the assembly itself, as in Argentina and Germany, rather than by 
the government, as was previously the case in the UK.11 Both informal, 
political selection processes and more formal eligibility, selection and 
vetting procedures will undoubtedly have an impact on the membership 
composition of an intelligence oversight committee. The inter-related 
issues of the extent of knowledge and depth of experience of members 
are also vital in assessing the measures for intelligence accountability. 
If accountability can be understood as the requirement for those in 
positions of power to provide answers to those whom they serve, then it 
is imperative that there is the requisite ability in an oversight committee 
to ask appropriate questions. Beyond an appropriately skilled and 
experienced membership, the issue of resources is also critical to the 
effectiveness of an intelligence oversight committee. Whilst Gill 
remarks upon the plethora of resources available to members in the 
US system, he also astutely recognises that ‘generous resources do 
not guarantee effectiveness’ if there is neither the will nor the skill to 
use them in the course of business.12 He continues that intelligence 
practitioners are highly skilled and can easily subvert the uninitiated 
outsider, and further contends that ‘the first task for any committee is 
to discover what the right questions are. This, in turn, depends on the 
expertise, experience and energy of members and staff, if any, and the 
will to use them’.13 This leads to the fifth factor that Gill outlines in his 
model: access to information. Gill describes this as ‘tokenistic’ because, 
even where legislation formally enables unrestricted access, committees 
still need to use skill in negotiating with informal gatekeepers in the 
agencies under scrutiny.14 The final factor considered by Gill is reporting, 
particularly in the context of the tension between the secrecy of the data 
to which committee members will have access and the requirement to 
provide meaningful information on the activities of intelligence agencies 
to the parent assembly and the public. This leaves parliamentarians or 
committee members in the ‘unenviable but inevitable position of being 
unable to tell their voters all that they know’.15
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid., p. 17.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., p. 18.
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11  Ibid.
12  Ibid., p. 17.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., p. 18.
130 Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris
Gill’s sexpartite model — encompassing form, mandate, 
membership, resources, access to information, and reporting — offers 
a useful model to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of an 
intelligence accountability regime. In his own evaluative study Gill 
concluded that whilst the ISC had made some appropriate criticisms 
of the UK intelligence agencies the Committee can be faulted for the 
essentially managerialist nature of its reports and its failure to provide 
adequate attention to issues of public education and human rights. 
Gill’s model for evaluation also provides a useful template to assess the 
measures proposed by the Scottish Government to provide intelligence 
accountability in the conditions of Scottish independence. The politics 
of intelligence in Scotland’s independence referendum debate were 
‘hidden’ in the sense that both public interest and political debate on 
this subject were quite limited in scope and intensity.16 The White 
Paper on independence outlined the Scottish Government’s vision of 
threats to security in an independent Scotland and how this newly-
independent country would respond to such threats. It claimed that 
upon independence a single security and intelligence agency would 
be established with a requirement to work with partners to ensure 
Scotland’s national security. The Scottish Government indicated that 
independence offered an opportunity to build a ‘new model’ for such 
work, which was fit for the twenty-first century and which provided 
a proportionate means of ensuring Scotland’s national security.17 
The establishment of a new security and intelligence agency would 
allow Scotland to ‘do things differently, unconstrained by historical 
structures and precedent’.18 Crucially in this context the White Paper 
on independence also indicated the proposed measures for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland, through the role of legislation, 
governance and oversight of this new Scottish security and intelligence 
agency. Considering such matters the White Paper stated that:
16  Colin Atkinson, ‘“The Scottish MI5 Station Will Change to MI6. And You Know 
What MI6 Does!” Understanding the Hidden Politics of Intelligence in Scotland’s 
Independence Referendum Debate’, Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, 21 
(2015), 5–24.
17  Scottish Government (2013), p. 261.
18  Ibid. 
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The controls put in place will be wide-ranging and comprehensive. The 
planned legislation will bring democratic control of our national security 
to Scotland for the first time. Scottish Ministers will be accountable to the 
Scottish Parliament for what a Scottish security and intelligence agency 
does in their name. The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish equivalent 
of the relevant Commissioners will scrutinise and challenge the work of 
the agency, including its covert work. They will be given clear legislative 
powers to support their work, including the power to require documents 
to be provided and to require the senior management of the agency to give 
evidence. There will also be detailed budget scrutiny from the Auditor 
General for Scotland, and the top-level budget will be scrutinised by the 
Scottish Parliament as part of the Budget Bill. This scrutiny will ensure 
that the agency is acting properly, legally, efficiently and effectively, 
in line with international principles for intelligence service oversight. 
These processes must take transparency as their starting point. But in 
so doing, they will appropriately and rigorously protect aspects of the 
agency’s work that cannot be made public, and will respect the control 
principle at all times.19
Given that there was no further discussion of intelligence accountability 
in the White Paper, this represents a useful point at which to apply Gill’s 
six variables in order to determine the effectiveness of any proposed 
accountability structures and processes for a new Scottish security and 
intelligence service in an independent Scotland.
The form and mandate of the prospective regime for intelligence 
accountability in an independent Scotland was broadly sketched within 
the constraints of the White Paper, which outlined that ‘Scottish Ministers 
will be accountable to the Scottish Parliament for what a Scottish security 
and intelligence agency does in their name’. This would include the 
introduction of ‘early legislation’, written constitutional rights for 
Scottish citizens and clear arrangements for investigatory powers that 
build upon — and update where necessary — the existing UK legislation 
19  Ibid., p. 266. The control principle, or rule, means that intelligence supplied by 
one party to another cannot be shared with an additional third-party without 
the originator’s consent. See Stéphane Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas 
of International Intelligence Cooperation’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence, 16, 4 (2003), 527–42 (p. 532). Discussing the difficulties of this 
principle Robert David Steele reduced the rationale to a clear and parsimonious 
statement: the default condition of the secret intelligence world is ‘do not share’. 
See R. D. Steele, ‘Open Source Intelligence ‘, in Strategic Intelligence: Understanding 
the Hidden Side of Government, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Westport, CT and London: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 95–122 (p. 113).
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governing such matters.20 Moreover, the White Paper detailed that 
the work of the Scottish security agency would be scrutinised and 
challenged by both the Scottish Parliament and ‘the Scottish equivalent 
of the relevant Commissioners’ — meaning the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, 
and the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners under the pre-existing 
UK arrangement — using ‘clear legislative powers’.21 Beyond the bold 
claims of the White Paper there clearly remain significant unanswered 
questions in relation to the form, and subsequently the membership 
and resources, of such a regime for intelligence accountability. The 
ISC, for example, is a parliamentary committee comprised of nine 
members, drawn from both the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords, with none permitted to be a Minister of the Crown. These 
members, who are normally seasoned parliamentarians with relevant 
experience, are nominated by the Prime Minister but their appointment 
must be approved by parliament. The ISC Chair is selected by its 
members. It is possible to infer that an ISC equivalent for Scotland was 
not explicitly mentioned due to the controversial reputation of the ISC 
in relation to its provision of effective oversight,22 but there nevertheless 
remain unanswered questions relating to exactly who, in a prospective 
Scottish Parliament for an independent Scotland, would be responsible 
for the scrutiny and oversight of a Scottish security agency, and how 
they would be selected. Compounding these uncertainties, the issue 
of specific resources for intelligence accountability were not given any 
consideration in the White Paper. Resources were only discussed in the 
context of establishing the new security and intelligence agency itself, 
and not the accountability mechanisms for this service. In relation to an 
intelligence agency itself the Scottish Government proposed to maintain 
a ‘comparable level of spending under independence’ in relation to 
Scotland’s pre-independence contribution,23 but this did not take 
into account any costs that would be associated with establishing the 
necessary resources to maintain effective oversight and accountability 
of this new security and intelligence agency. The most recent update 
20  Scottish Government (2013), p. 266.
21  Ibid. 
22  See Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014). 
23  Scottish Government (2013), p. 266.
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from the ISC, following reforms made under the Justice and Security 
Act 2013, reported that it was supported by ten staff and an investigator, 
with a total budget of around £1.3 million per annum.24 There was no 
indication of the resources available to fund a Scottish mechanism for 
intelligence accountability.
Access to information and the ability to report such information 
effectively are vital components of any effective regime for intelligence 
accountability. The Scottish Government’s White Paper was clear that 
both the Scottish Parliament and relevant commissioners would be given 
clear legislative powers to support their work, including the powers to 
require the provision of documents from a Scottish security agency and 
to require the agency’s senior management to give evidence.25 There was 
no real clarity in Scotland’s Future on the ways in which such information 
would be reported, beyond taking transparency as ‘a starting-point’ 
whilst respecting both the need to protect the agency’s work where 
necessary and the control principle. In broadly resonating with the 
UK legislation and arrangements — and particularly the Justice and 
Security Act 2013, which reformed and emboldened the ISC — these 
commitments ultimately appear as a case of plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose, a feature that inhabits (or inhibits) much of the thinking on 
issues of intelligence and security in the Scottish Government’s White 
Paper. The political strategy of such an approach is expedient and 
understandable: gain public confidence through political reassurance. It 
is worth recalling here, however, that Gill warned against the ‘tokenism’ 
of legislation, highlighting the requirement for the use of skill in 
negotiating with informal gatekeepers in the agencies under scrutiny.26 
In this context the immaturity of Scotland’s political structures in 
dealing with matters of national security must be considered. 
Scotland’s Future was explicit in stating that the planned legislation 
would bring democratic control of national security to Scotland for the 
first time. A case can certainly be constructed that the existing cadre 
of 129 elected members in the Scottish Parliament broadly lacks the 
24  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament Annual Report 2015–2016 (London: HMSO, 2016), https://b1cba9 
b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/2015- 
2016_ISC_AR.pdf
25  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2016).
26  Gill (2007), p. 17.
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capacity and capability to effectively scrutinise an emerging intelligence 
and security agency with the same rigour as that of its Westminster 
counterpart. It is true to say that an intelligence oversight committee in 
Scotland would have less ground to cover, at least in the longer-term, 
and would thus require fewer political representatives to function 
effectively. However, it is unclear as to whether, based on the existing 
arrangements, there would actually be enough MSPs with the skills, 
knowledge and experience to provide the necessary level of scrutiny, 
particularly given the expanded remit of a newly independent Scottish 
Parliament to provide governance of, and accountability for, whole 
new swathes of political activity. The provision of additional civil 
service support would also be necessary, but at least here a case can be 
made, cost permitting, for the ‘poaching’ of expertise from the existing 
UK structures. In considering the Scottish Government’s proposal for 
intelligence accountability a key question thus emerges: would an 
independent Scotland have the right people asking the right questions, 
as well as the necessary resources, to hold a developing intelligence and 
security agency to account effectively? The answer to this question may 
be informed by a considered analysis of the successes and failures of 
intelligence oversight and accountability in other European nations that 
are comparatively similar to Scotland.
Comparison with accountability 
mechanisms in other jurisdictions 
The French security expert Philippe Hayez recently remarked that 
intelligence and security services have moved from serving princes 
to serving citizens.27 Not only do contemporary democratic societies 
now require their intelligence agencies to be accountable, but the 
bodies responsible for this task are often overseeing secretive agencies 
that have been established for a considerable period of time. The 
White Paper, Scotland’s Future, argues that this is to Scotland’s benefit, 
allowing Scotland to proceed unburdened by the past; however, as 
previously argued in this chapter, there are real challenges with regards 
27  P. Hayez, ‘National Oversight of International Intelligence Cooperation’, in 
International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, ed. by H. Born, I. Leigh, and 
A. Wills (Abingdon and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), pp. 151–69 (p. 151).
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to the extent to which the Scottish Parliament would have the capacity 
and capability to carry out this task. Nevertheless, in comparing an 
independent Scotland to other similar nations it is clear that Scotland is 
in a unique position to establish, at the same time, both a new security 
agency and mechanisms for the oversight of such an agency.
The unique position of Scotland in relation to the simultaneous 
design and implementation of both an intelligence service and an 
accountability mechanism is further compounded when one considers 
the post-‘shock’ modification of intelligence oversight. Writing on 
intelligence oversight in the US in the Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 
Loch K. Johnson noted,
An analysis of intelligence accountability indicates a pattern in recent 
decades: a major intelligence scandal or failure — a shock — converts 
perfunctory patrolling into a burst of intense firefighting, which is 
the followed by a period of dedicated patrolling that yields remedial 
legislation or other reforms designed to curb inappropriate activities 
in the future. […] Once the firestorm has subsided and reforms are in 
place, however, lawmakers return to a state of relative inattention to 
intelligence issues.28
Johnson’s argument, one that has played out frequently in the post-
9/11 security landscape, is that the greatest impetus for the progress of 
oversight is an intelligence failure or scandal that leads to public demand 
for change. Terrorist attacks by groups linked to Al Qaeda in Madrid and 
London, the massacre committed by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway, 
and the killing of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands all prompted 
inquiries about intelligence failures. Such inquiries, which fall under the 
purview of security oversight, were carried out by existing or specially-
convened bodies, and from which changes were assumed to follow. 
Similarly, the intelligence scandals surrounding the recourse to the 2003 
Iraq War, the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and the revelations 
from whistle blowers such as Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, have all 
had a similar impact: leading to inquiries that can be considered within 
the remit of oversight and intelligence accountability. It is from the 
shock of intelligence failures and scandals that progress on intelligence 
28  L. K. Johnson, ‘A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence’, 
in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. by L. K. Johnson (Abingdon and New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2007), pp. 343–60 (p. 344).
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and security oversight is frequently made, thus raising the possibility 
that the measures for intelligence accountability in Scotland may not 
be fully effective until a similar shock is experienced. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of intelligence oversight and accountability mechanisms 
can be evaluated and further developed by considering the process in 
similar nations.
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, Scotland’s Future indicated that 
an independent Scotland would draw from the UK model of security 
intelligence oversight, with little indication that any such model would 
be tailored to fit the challenges of the Scottish context. An independent 
Scotland would have a more limited global reach, presence, and footprint 
than that of the UK, with the possible implication that Scotland would 
face a decreased threat from international terrorism, as well as other 
security risks. This could be termed the ‘small nation security dividend’. 
This section will consider approaches to intelligence oversight and 
accountability in two states closer in size and global presence to 
Scotland: Norway and Belgium.29 The appropriate mechanisms in these 
two nations will be examined to identify the viability of alternative 
approaches beyond the replication of the UK model in the context of an 
independent Scotland.
Norway
Writing about intelligence oversight in Norway before the attacks 
committed by Anders Behring Breivik, Fredrik Sejersted argued, ‘the 
preconditions for making intelligence accountable are among the most 
favourable in the world. If democratic oversight is not possible [in 
Norway], it is not possible anywhere’.30 The Norwegian model focuses 
on legislative oversight, with accountability directly falling to the 
Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and the Security 
Services (known as the EOS Committee). The EOS Committee was 
29  Ireland, a country with historical, cultural and societal similarities to Scotland, was 
also considered for comparison, but the absence of a dedicated security agency 
raises several challenges in relation to a comparative study of intelligence oversight 
regimes.
30  F. Sejersted, ‘Intelligence and Accountability in a State without Enemies: The Case of 
Norway’, in Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, 
ed. by H. Born, L. K. Johnson, and I. Leigh (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 
pp. 119–41 (p. 120). 
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established in the 1990s based on the recommendations of the Lund 
Commission, established to consider accusations of illegal surveillance 
by the security services. This Committee is appointed by and reports 
directly to Parliament, containing seven non-parliamentary members: 
an aspect that differs from oversight models in other Western states 
that draw their personnel from parliamentarians. The Committee 
operates with a high level of independence from political interference, 
and conducts oversight in two ways: ‘through inspections of the 
agencies, and by dealing with complaints and inquiries’.31 Returning 
to the six key variables outlined by Gill, Norway’s accountability 
mechanisms meet these criteria fully with regards to membership, form 
and mandate. In addition to the work of the committee, the executive 
retains control over traditional elements of the oversight infrastructure 
through traditional governmental administrative structures. The main 
purpose of the Committee’s work is safeguarding individuals against 
abuses committed by the security agencies (focusing on the protection 
of civil liberties and restricting intrusive surveillance methods), but it 
largely refrains from evaluating and analysing the efforts of the security 
agencies, with this task falling to the executive branch.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks committed by Anders Behring 
Breivik in July 2011, a ten-person special commission headed by 
Alexandra Bech Gjørv was established to ascertain the facts behind the 
attacks and make recommendations to help prevent similar attacks in 
the future. Their report, delivered in August 2012, indicated that the 
police could have done more to prevent the bombings and criticised 
the response to reports of shootings on Utøya, especially the time it 
took to reach the island itself.32 The Gjørv report could be considered an 
extraordinary act of security oversight, coming in the wake of a shock. 
Norway, so often portrayed by many as a nation from which Scotland 
would do well to learn lessons, introduced oversight measures in the 
direct wake of an intelligence scandal in the mid-1990s, and the Breivik 
attacks on 2011. In line with the social democratic values often associated 
with Scandinavian states, Norway has chosen to isolate its oversight 
infrastructure from direct political control by granting the principal 
31  Sejersted (2005), p. 128.
32  [N.a.], ‘Norway Police “Could Have Stopped Breivik Sooner”’, BBC News, 13 
August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19241327
138 Colin Atkinson, Nick Brooke and Brian Harris
committee substantial independence, whilst retaining executive 
control of the security services. Moreover, the committee’s focus on 
preventing abuses of Norwegian citizens by the security agencies is 
logical considering the reduced threat of international terrorism faced 
by Norway.
Belgium
Belgium, is a smaller country geographically than Scotland but twice as 
populous, with nearly eleven million citizens. Like Scotland, it borders 
a much larger country that has been directly attacked by actors linked 
to international terrorist groups in the last decade. Similar to Norway, 
the Belgian intelligence and security oversight body (the Standing 
Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, or Committee I) was set up in 
the 1990s and maintains a public presence. The Committee consists of 
three individuals, one of whom acts as chairman, a position that must be 
held by a magistrate.33 The Belgium Senate appoints these individuals, 
as well as two substitute members on a six-year term. The principal 
role of the Committee is described as ‘reviewing the activities and 
functioning of State Security and the General Intelligence and Security 
Service […] [and] the functioning of the Coordination Unit for Threat 
Assessment and the various services that support this coordination unit’, 
focusing on the ‘legitimacy (review of observance of the applicable 
laws and regulations), effectiveness (supervision of the efficiency of the 
intelligence services), and coordination (the mutual harmonization of 
the work of the services concerned)’ of these bodies.34
Broadly similar to Norway and Scotland in international profile, 
Belgium demonstrates the limits of reliance on the ‘small nation security 
dividend’, as the events of 22 March 2016 demonstrated, when thirty-
two people were killed by three bombings in the capital, Brussels: the 
first two at the city’s airport, the latter on the Metro. This attack came 
only months after the November 2015 Paris attack, carried out by a 
Belgian-based group of Islamic State supporters, of whom some were 
33  [N.a.], ‘A Review Committee Acting as an Jurisdictional Body. The New Role of 
the Belgian Committee within the Framework of Reviewing Special Intelligence 
Methods’, in Workshop on Best Practices for Intelligence and Intelligence Oversight, 
Montreux, 1–2 March 2010.
34  Ibid. 
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Belgian-born.35 Previous to this, Belgium has witnessed the threat from 
its own citizens returning from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq in a deadly 
attack on a Jewish Museum in Brussels in June 2014 and the killing of two 
‘suspected jihadists’ who had been suspected by police of an imminent 
attack in January 2015.36 This rapid series of events has led to suggestions 
that Belgian intelligence is ‘regarded as weak […] more divided than 
most and more beset with scandals and charges of inefficiency’.37 In 
response to these attacks, and to questions about the ability of the 
Belgian intelligence services, the president of Committee I, Guy Rapaille, 
pushed back, stating, ‘these attacks show that more coordination with 
the United States is clearly desirable […] but you have to remember that 
big powers guard their intelligence very closely’.38 Furthermore, another 
member of the oversight committee publicly suggested, ‘we are paying 
for our naïveté […] it’s not a weakness in intelligence. It’s a weakness in 
society’.39 Thus, in a short space of time Belgium has gained experience 
in the necessity of responding to the threat of international terrorism 
and it seems likely that Committee I will have a substantial role to play 
in investigating the extent to which the intelligence agencies failed, and 
how these inadequacies can be addressed.
The most visible component of Committee I is its Investigation 
Service, which can carry out investigations based on ‘its own initiative, 
on the request of the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives or the 
competent minister or authority,40 or on the request of a citizen or a 
35  [N.a.], ‘Paris and Brussels Bombers’ Links Uncovered’, BBC News, 9 April 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35879401 
36  [N.a.], ‘Belgian Anti-Terror Raid in Verviers Leaves Two Dead’, BBC News, 16 
January 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30840160 
37  John Lloyd, ‘The World’s Spies Agree Belgian Intelligence Is Broken’, Reuters, 24 
March 2016, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/03/24/how-the-worlds- 
intelligence-services-rate-each-other/ 
38  Mark Hosenball, ‘U.S. Frustration Simmers over Belgium’s Struggle with 
Militant Threat’, Reuters, 24 March 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us- 
belgium-blast-usa-intelligence-idUSKCN0WQ0BU
39  Adam Nossiter, ‘Brussels Attacks Underscore Vulnerability of an Open European 
Society’, The New York Times, 25 March 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/
world/europe/belgium-security.html
40  When asked to carry out an investigation by Parliament or by Ministers of Justice, 
Defence or the Interior, Committee I is required to carry out the investigation. 
Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, ‘Home’ (2016), http://www.
comiteri.be/index.php/en/. See Peter De Smet, ‘Excerpt of the Speech Held at the 
6th International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference (‘Does Setting Priorities 
Mean “to Lose”?’)’, in 6th International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference (New 
Zealand, 2008). 
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civil servant who lodges a complaint or files a denunciation’ or ‘in the 
framework of a parliamentary enquiry’.41 The Committee is a powerful 
body: it can compel the security services to provide all documents 
relating to an investigation that it chooses to undertake, and because 
all members and employees of the committee hold security clearance, 
they can request classified material. Furthermore, the Committee has 
the power to ‘advise’ the Belgian courts on the legality of ‘special and 
exceptional methods’ and ‘forbid the further use of the method in 
question’ if deemed illegal.42 Additionally, the Committee can summon 
anyone to undertake an interview and may require the individual 
to testify under oath, as well as having strong reporting capacities. 
Committee I is extraordinarily powerful when it comes to requesting 
information and testimony. Thus, there are many similarities between 
these two cases: operating independently from parliament with strong 
investigative powers. 
Reflections on the Scottish case
Scotland has, in different ways, much in common with the two 
countries considered here. Whilst it is tempting to rely on the small-
nation dividend when considering the security implications for an 
independent Scotland the series of terrorist attacks conducted, or 
planned, in Belgium between 2014 and 2016, and the attacks of Anders 
Breivik in Norway, caution against complacency, particularly if an 
independent Scotland sought to remain a close ally of both the UK and 
the US. With particular regards to intelligence accountability, Scotland 
could benefit from considering the examples of Norway and Belgium 
in the appointment of non-parliamentary experts to the oversight 
committees. This would alleviate the problem that results from the 
lack of experience, expertise and skill in overseeing the functions 
of the intelligence security services among the vast majority of the 
existing cadre of Scottish parliamentarians. Furthermore, these cases 
demonstrate some of the advantages of legislative independence of the 
primary security and intelligence oversight bodies, and Scotland would 
be well served if a similar model were adopted. Yet when it comes to 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid.
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security oversight there is no model that Scotland should adopt in its 
entirety, and the requirement would remain to structure a security 
and intelligence service and accountability mechanisms to meet the 
challenges faced by an independent Scotland.
Post-referendum politics and intelligence 
accountability 
The 2014 Scottish referendum on independence and the 2015 UK General 
Election remain fresh in the collective political consciousness, not least 
given the decision of the UK electorate in June 2016 to leave the European 
Union. Considered and dispassionate analysis of post-referenda politics 
has therefore been limited in volume, breadth and rigour. It is clear that, 
whilst Scotland voted to remain part of the UK, the electoral landscape 
of both Scottish and UK politics was transformed by the landslide 
victory for the pro-independence SNP in the 2015 UK General Election, 
which returned 56 Scottish representatives to Westminster from a 
possible total of 59. Whilst there is some scholarship and commentary 
on the most prominent issues affecting this post-referendum political 
landscape — from tax powers43 to Trident44 — the impact of the Scottish 
referendum White Paper, debate, result and subsequent electoral 
outcomes on the accountability of the intelligence agencies in the UK 
has attracted little to no attention. The nature of this now transformed 
post-referendum politics, however, may possibly herald some important 
consequences for both intelligence accountability in the UK and any 
future plan for accountability mechanisms in an independent Scotland.
The most immediate outcome for intelligence accountability in post-
referendum politics in the UK was apparent in the third variable in 
Gill’s sexpartite model: the change in membership of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee. The dissolution of parliament in advance of 
the 2015 General Election necessitated the parallel dissolution of the 
ISC. Previous ISC members ceased to be so. Similarly, the election of a 
new government required that a new ISC membership be established. 
43  J. Aitken, ‘The Continuing Battle for Scottish Tax Powers’, in After Independence: 
The State of the Scottish Nation Debate, ed. by G. Hassan and J. Mitchell (Edinburgh: 
Luath Press Ltd, 2013). 
44  W. Walker, ‘Trident’s Insecure Anchorage’, in Hassan and Mitchell (2013).
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Following the electoral success of the SNP there emerged some support 
for the inclusion of an SNP member on this new ISC, with initial reports 
suggesting that Scotland’s former First Minister, Alex Salmond, would 
be the front-runner for such a post.45 The inclusion of SNP representation 
on the ISC, whoever the member would be, received a mixed response 
from some quarters. For example, a small number of Unionist MPs 
voiced concern over the SNP stance on key issues of defence and security, 
whilst others accepted the requirement for SNP representation on the 
ISC as part of the democratic process.46 Following the 2015 General 
Election the SNP was given representation on the ISC: on 9 September 
2015 the Rt Hon Angus Robertson MP was nominated to this committee 
and subsequently appointed by the Prime Minister. The appointment of 
Robertson, the parliamentary group leader of the SNP at Westminster, 
is notable not only for his support for independence and his opposition 
to the UK nuclear deterrent capability, but also for his views on the role 
and remit of the ISC. Robertson has been, for example, critical of the UK 
Government in relation to parliamentary oversight of UK drone strikes 
in Syria.47 The impact of the change in ISC membership may, however, 
extend beyond a shift in the nature of intelligence accountability in the 
UK context; the inclusion of SNP representation on the ISC may also 
provide valuable experience, capital, and political legitimacy that could 
deepen and enhance any future plans for intelligence accountability in 
an independent Scotland.
The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence was undertaken 
on the shared proviso that it would be a ‘once in a generation’ event;48 
45  See ‘Salmond Lined up for Role as Top Spy Chief’, Sunday Post, 10 May 2015, https://
www.sundaypost.com/news/scottish-news/salmond-lined-up-for-role-as-top-spy-
chief/ This speculation was seemingly predicated on two factors. Firstly, that ISC 
members are by convention also Privy Councillors, and Alex Salmond was then the 
only Privy Councillor in the SNP’s ranks. Secondly, that Salmond had ruled himself 
out of other important roles at Westminster.
46  Michael Settle, ‘Tory Fears over Allowing SNP Role in UK Security’, Herald, 22 
May 2015, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13214836.Tory_fears_over_ 
allowing_SNP_role_in_UK_security/ 
47  House of Commons, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 09 Sep 2015 (Pt 0001) 
(London: HMSO, 2015), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/
cmhansrd/cm150909/debtext/150909-0001.htm#15090926000005
48  Karen McVeigh, ‘Scottish Referendum: Yes and No Agree It’s a Once-in-a-Lifetime 
Vote’, Guardian, 17 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/
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however, the issue of a second referendum has remained very much 
in the political spotlight.49 As previously argued in this chapter, the 
mechanism for intelligence accountability sketched in Scotland’s Future 
offered little deviation from the existing UK model. In the context of a 
future referendum on Scottish independence, however, one of the most 
significant political consequences of the revised membership of the 
ISC may be the experience and, more importantly, political legitimacy, 
gained through SNP representation on the ISC, and the associated 
capital and credibility that would be accrued as a result. As Bochel, 
Defty, and Kirkpatrick noted in Watching the Watchers,
Like the departmental select committees, the ISC has allowed a small 
number of parliamentarians to acquire specialist knowledge in a 
particular policy area, and moreover one in which few parliamentarians 
have had any prior experience.50
Nevertheless, there will remain challenges for a prospective intelligence 
accountability mechanism in Scotland, particularly given that the 
ISC has, to a great extent, relied upon the experience of its members 
from both chambers of the UK parliament.51 The nature of the now 
transformed post-referenda political landscape in the UK — where 
Nationalist representation at Westminster is stronger than ever before 
and the prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence 
remains a clear possibility — may result in some significant changes 
in the practices of intelligence accountability in the UK and the rigour 
of any proposed mechanisms for intelligence accountability in an 
independent Scotland.
sep/17/scottish-independence-referendum-yes-no-agree-once-in-lifetime-vote; 
Keely Lockhart, ‘Alex Salmond: “This Is a Once in a Generation Opportunity for 
Scotland”’, Telegraph, 14 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/scottish-independence/11095210/Alex-Salmond-This-is-a-once-in-a-
generation-opportunity-for-Scotland.html
49  [N.a.], ‘Nicola Sturgeon Asks Opponents to Back Second Independence 
Referendum’, BBC News, 24 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-scotland-scotland-politics-34333394; Jon Stone, ‘Second Scottish Independence 
Referendum Is Inevitable, Says Nicola Sturgeon’, Independent, 12 October 2015, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/another-scottish-independence-
referendum-is-inevitable-says-nicola-sturgeon-a6690586.html
50  Bochel, Defty, and Kirkpatrick (2014), p. 77.
51  Ibid., p. 79.
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the politics of intelligence accountability 
in the context of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and 
the 2015 General Election. It examined and evaluated the Scottish 
Government’s vision for the accountability of a proposed new security 
and intelligence service in Scotland, exploring the consequences of 
the decision to remain in the UK and the 2015 electoral outcome on 
both intelligence accountability mechanisms in the UK and for a future 
independent Scotland. Drawing upon Gill’s model for assessing the 
effectiveness of security intelligence accountability, the chapter argued 
that the Scottish Government’s proposals for accountability mechanisms 
were vague, but inherently conservative, indicating a continuation of 
similar mechanisms used in the existing UK political settlement. This 
issue was brought into particular focus by exploring the accountability 
mechanisms for security intelligence in other jurisdictions, a process that 
highlights how shortcomings in the Scottish Government’s proposals 
could have been addressed by learning lessons and adopting practices 
and processes from beyond the UK. Despite Scotland’s decision to 
remain part of the UK, the aftermath of the referendum, particularly 
the landslide victory in Scotland for the pro-independence SNP in the 
2015 UK General Election, may herald some important consequences 
for both intelligence accountability in the UK and any future plan for 
accountability mechanisms in an independent Scotland. The previously 
unconsidered prospect of direct SNP representation on the ISC — now 
a reality in the UK — raises the issue that pro-independence politicians 
will develop the expertise, capital, and political legitimacy necessary 
for effective intelligence accountability that were lacking in the pre-
referendum political landscape.
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